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Abstract 
Aviation maintenance has been identified by the FAA as an area where better efficiency is 
needed to cope with ever increasing workloads. However, aviation maintenance has also been 
identified as one of the major causes of accidents. Consequently, if further efficiencies are to be 
achieved, they cannot come at the cost of reduced safety margins. The present study employed a 
safety climate approach to assist in the development of a model that can help to explain morale, 
psychological health, turnover intentions, and error in the aviation maintenance environment. An 
instrument called the Maintenance Environment Survey was developed and administered to 240 
personnel responsible for maintenance of a large military helicopter fleet. Data collected through 
the survey were used to develop a structural model that predicted 45% of the variance in 
psychological health, 67% of the variance in morale, 27% of the variance in turnover intentions, 
and 44% of the variance in self-reported maintenance errors. The model shows the pathways 
through which organizational level and individual level variables can influence work outcomes 
and leads to suggestions for interventions that can help to improve maintenance efficiency. 
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The role of Organizational and Individual Variables in Aircraft Maintenance Performance  
 
The importance of the maintenance function was captured by Weick and colleagues when 
they observed that: “Maintenance people come into contact with the largest number of failures, 
at earlier stages of development, and have an ongoing sense of the vulnerabilities in the 
technology, sloppiness in the operations, gaps in the procedures, and sequences by which one 
error triggers another” (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999, p. 93). A significant proportion of 
these errors come at the hands of the maintainers themselves as the ever-increasing complexity 
of aviation places greater demands on those responsible for their maintenance.  
 
Figures emerging from the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) show a 
steady rise in the number of maintenance error mandatory occurrence reports over the period 
1990 to 2000 (Courteney, 2001). A recent Boeing study of worldwide commercial jet aircraft 
accidents over that same period shows a significant increase in the rate of accidents where 
maintenance and inspection were primary factors (cited in ICAO, 2003). The FAA, in its 
strategic plan for human factors in aviation maintenance through to 2003, cited statistics from the 
Air Transport Association of America (ATA) showing that the number of passenger miles flown 
by the largest US airlines increased 187% from 1983 through to 1995. Over that same period, the 
number of aircraft operated by those airlines increased 70% but the number of aviation 
maintenance technicians increased only 27%. The FAA concluded that the only way the 
maintenance program could cope with the increased workload was by increased efficiency at the 
worker level (cited in McKenna, 2002).  
 
Despite the awareness of the importance of maintenance to the aviation industry and the 
growing problems confronting maintenance, until recently, empirical research into the nature of 
maintenance work and related human factors has been negligible. The development of 
descriptive models of human error and accident causation (Reason, 1990; Senders & Moray, 
1991) and the recent adaptation of Reason’s model to aviation maintenance (Reason & Hobbs, 
2003) are major steps in the right direction. Research on error classification schemes (e.g., 
Patankar, 2002; Shappell & Weigmann, 1997) and, more recently, safety culture (Taylor & 
Thomas, 2003; Patankar, 2003) represent other bright spots in a surprisingly sparse research 
literature. However, what are needed in addition to the descriptive accident causation models, 
classification schemes, and culture surveys are empirically validated models that capture the 
major influences on maintenance work and provide a means of assessing these influences. 
Models of this kind can provide the basis for predicting unsafe organizational states and 
designing interventions that will lead to reductions in maintenance errors. The present study set 
out to develop such a model within the context of aviation maintenance using a multivariate 
methodology that has its roots in what has become known as the safety climate approach. This 
approach is described in the following paragraphs. 
 
Safety Climate and Safety Culture 
 Over the years, the concepts of safety culture and safety climate have developed almost 
in parallel through the safety literature.  Safety climate is operationalised in the current study as 
the individual’s perceptions of the organizational policies, procedures, and rewards relevant to 
safety in the organization (Guldenmund, 2000; Griffin & Neal, 2000). This definition sets it apart 
from safety culture, which is usually regarded as a stable, deep-seated aspect of an organization 
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that expresses itself through climate (Guldenmund, 2000, p.221). Whereas the assessment of 
safety culture requires tangible means of measurement such as in-depth interviews and analysis 
of stated safety goals and polices (Guldenmund, 2000;  Mearns & Flin, 1999), safety climate is 
assessed through self-report questionnaires.  
 
Constructing a Measure of Safety Climate 
Attempts have been made to define a core set of constructs for safety climate (see Flin, 
Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000). Although not entirely successful in establishing core 
dimensions, this research is useful in suggesting constructs that should be considered for 
inclusion in research on maintenance errors. Recent publications relating to the assessment of 
safety climate in aviation maintenance also provide guidance. Taylor and Thomas (2003), for 
example, used a self-report questionnaire called the Maintenance Resource 
Management/Technical Operations Questionnaire (MRM/TOQ) to measure what they regarded 
as two fundamental parameters in aviation maintenance: professionalism and trust. The 
dimension of professionalism is defined in their questionnaire in terms of reactions to work 
stressors and personal assertiveness. Trust is defined in terms of relations with coworkers and 
supervisors. Questions relating to these areas also appear in the questionnaire to be used in the 
current research. Patankar (2003) constructed a questionnaire called the Organizational Safety 
Culture Questionnaire which included questions from the MRM/TOQ along with items from 
questionnaires developed outside the maintenance environment. Following the application of 
exploratory factor analytic routines to a dataset generated from respondents that included 124 
maintenance engineers, Patankar identified four factors as having particular relevance to the 
safety goals of aviation organizations: emphasis on compliance with standard operating 
procedures, collective commitment to safety, individual sense of responsibility toward safety, 
and a high level of employee-management trust.  
 
Turning to the general safety literature, there are now a host of questionnaires that 
purport to measure either safety culture or safety climate. Wiegmann and his colleagues 
(Wiegmann, von Thaden, Mitchell, Sharma, & Zhang, 2003) drew upon 13 such measures to 
construct their Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS), an instrument designed for use with 
pilots. Most of these questionnaires are multidimensional, covering a range of factors that the 
authors consider to be of relevance to safety performance. The availability of so many 
questionnaires tapping an array of safety-related constructs presents a challenge to researchers 
interested in constructing a safety climate survey for use in specific settings such as maintenance.  
 
That challenge was addressed in the present study by using the principle of triangulation 
to isolate the constructs relevant to a maintenance environment. Drawing upon the distinction 
between culture and climate made earlier, this methodology entailed a close examination of the 
safety culture in an organization in order to derive questions for inclusion in a safety climate 
survey. The first step in the triangulation process involved a search of the safety literature to 
identify potential constructs for inclusion in the questionnaire. As already mentioned, there is no 
shortage of surveys in the literature and some researchers have attempted to identify core safety 
climate constructs (e.g., Flin et al., 2000). The second step involved the analysis of a 
maintenance incident database and the associated incident investigation reports. The database 
and incident reports highlighted the relevance of factors such as inadequate training, poor 
supervision, and individual factors such as stress and fatigue as causes of maintenance-related 
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incidents. The third method involved a series of focus group interviews with maintenance 
personnel and their supervisors to ascertain their perceptions of factors that impact on 
maintenance work. Content analyses of these interviews highlighted organizational concerns 
such as scheduling and resources.  
 
Information collected in these three phases was then used as the basis for the construction 
of a questionnaire to measure organizational and individual factors considered likely to impact 
on maintenance performance. The resulting questionnaire, called the Maintenance Environment 
Survey (MES), was broader in scope than many of the existing climate or culture surveys. It 
contained questions intended to define the following constructs: a) safety climate, b) morale, c) 
psychological health, d) job turnover intentions, and e) maintenance errors.  
 
The construction and validation of the MES was a necessary first step towards the 
development and validation of a structural model showing how the various factors captured by 
the survey interact to influence maintenance errors. Despite the proliferation of studies reporting 
new safety climate questionnaires, there are few studies in the safety literature that have taken 
the extra step of constructing models to illustrate the interactions among the psychological 
factors captured by the questionnaires. Using climate surveys in combination with the techniques 
of multivariate analysis, especially path analysis and structural equation modeling, it is possible 
to capture elements of the accident causation process and to test different models of how the 
components of the system work. These models can then be used to direct interventions aimed at 
improving safety performance in the maintenance environment. The rationale for the model to be 
tested in the present study is set out in the following paragraphs. 
 
Developing a Model to Predict Maintenance Errors  
Regarding the relations between safety climate and maintenance errors, there is now a 
substantial body of empirical evidence from the general safety literature to support the 
contention that measures of climate are related to safety outcomes. This relationship has been 
demonstrated in cross-sectional surveys where scores on safety climate scales have been linked 
with accidents (Donald & Canter, 1994; Zohar, 1980), in longitudinal studies (Neal & Griffin, 
2002), in intervention studies (Donald & Young, 1996), in individual as well as group-level 
studies (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 2000), and across a very wide range of industrial 
settings. These settings include hospitals (Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000), the offshore oil industry 
(Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 2001), the power industry (Donald & Young, 1996), and 
chemical processing plants (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996).  
 
Most of these studies used regression and bivariate correlations to demonstrate the 
existence of a relationship between safety climate and safety performance. However, a small 
group of studies have used path analysis or structural equation modelling (SEM) to explain the 
observed relationships (e.g., Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999, Neal et al., 2000, Tomás, Melia, & 
Oliver, 1999; Oliver, Cheyne, Tomas, & Cox, 2002). Together, the two groups of studies 
provided the basis for a hypothesized SEM model that was expected to capture variance in self-
reported maintenance errors. The model is shown in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1 Hypothesised model showing relations among Climate, Morale, Health, Turnover, and Errors 
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It can be seen that the full model contains both a measurement and a structural 
component. Description of the variables that make up the measurement component is deferred 
until the Method section. A brief description of the structural component is presented here. The 
first component of the model concerns the safety climate section of the MES. James and James 
(1989) argued that the various dimensions of climate reflect a higher-order factor (General 
Psychological Climate, PCg). Safety climate variables are therefore shown as indicators of a 
latent Safety Climate construct (James & James, 1989). Safety Climate was expected to 
influence a second latent construct labeled Morale which was measured by the Commitment, Job 
Satisfaction, and Responsibility variables. Safety Climate was also expected to influence the 
psychological health of the individual maintenance workers, a construct that has been labeled 
simply as Health and that was captured by the measures of stress, fatigue, and the General Health 
Questionnaire (GHQ: Goldberg and Williams, 1988).  Support for these separate pathways to 
Morale and Health can be found in the work of Hart (1994) showing that morale and 
psychological distress are separate outcomes of positive and negative work experiences.  Support 
for the mediating role of psychological health can be found in the work of Oliver et al. (2002) 
who examined the relationships between individual psychological, work environment, and 
organizational variables and occupational accidents using SEM. They found that the individual 
level variables, including safe behaviour and general health, mediated the effects of the 
organizational variables on accidents. Stress, in particular, was an important mediator of both 
organizational and environmental variables. 
The pathway from Morale to Turnover was based on well-replicated organizational 
research demonstrating a strong inverse relationship between commitment and job satisfaction, 
on the one hand, and turnover intentions on the other (Hulin, 1991). All three latent constructs – 
Climate, Morale, and Health – were expected to contribute to the variance in self-reported errors. 
From a theoretical point of view, the role of turnover intentions and its relationship with errors 
was not all that clear. Reflecting the exploratory nature of some aspects of this study, and bearing 
in mind its expected relationship with Morale, Turnover is shown as influencing Errors.  
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
A total of 240 maintenance engineers (232 males) working at the two main helicopter 
repair bases for the Australian Army responded to the survey, representing a response rate of 
over 90%. Supervisors, inspectors, and higher level managers were also surveyed but their 
responses will not be considered here. The survey was targeted primarily at tradespersons (79%) 
and trainees (21%). The average age of the respondents was 28.5 years and most respondents 
(84%) had been working as a maintenance engineer or a trainee engineer for at least one year.  
 
Materials 
In many instances, scales were already available to measure particular constructs of 
interest to this study but the approach taken here was that the questionnaire should be tailored to 
a maintenance context. Accordingly, although individual items may be the same as those used by 
other researchers, each of the scales was developed for the purpose of this study. The 
questionnaire commenced with a series of 12 demographic questions relating to age, training, 
years of service, and particular area of expertise (e.g., avionics). Unless otherwise indicated, the 
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remaining questions in the survey employed a five-point Likert scale format where 1 indicated 
strong disagreement and 5 strong agreement. Some items were reverse-scored to encourage 
respondents to read each question carefully. Scales were formed on the basis of the factor 
analysis and average scores obtained by dividing total scores by the number of items in the scale. 
The scales are described below. 
 
A. Safety Climate 
1. Recognition for doing good work (5 items). Sample item: In this job, people are rewarded 
according to performance. 
2. Safety focus of the organization (5 items). Sample item: This unit regards safety as a major 
factor in achieving its goals. 
3. Supervision standards (6 items). Sample item: My immediate supervisor really understands the 
maintenance task. 
4. Feedback on work performance (7 items). Sample item: The quality of our work is rated or 
evaluated frequently. 
5. Training standards and appropriateness (5 items). Sample item: My training and experience 
have prepared me well for the duties of my current job. 
 
B. Morale 
6. Job satisfaction (7 items). Sample item: I like maintenance work. 
7. Commitment to the organization (7 items). Sample item: I am proud to tell others that I am 
part of this unit. 
8. Sense of personal responsibility (5 items). Sample item: Whether or not my job gets done is 
clearly up to me.  
 
C. Psychological Health 
 9. Exposure to workplace stressors (10 items). Sample item: I get anxious when I work to strict 
deadlines. 
10. Fatigue (5 items). Sample item: My overall sleep quality is extremely poor. 
11. Psychological Health. The abbreviated, 12-item form of the General Health Questionnaire 
(GHQ: Goldberg and Williams, 1988) was used. The GHQ explores four aspects of 
psychological health: somatic symptoms; anxiety and insomnia; social dysfunction; and 
severe depression. High scores indicate poor psychological health.  
 
D. Outcome Variables 
12. Turnover intentions (1 item). Respondents were required to indicate one of three options: 
whether they intended to keep working in the maintenance industry (scored 1), whether 
they were uncertain (2), or whether they were resolved to leave the industry (3).  
13. Maintenance errors (5 items). Sample item: I make errors in my job from time to time. 
 
E. Affectivity 
Positive (PA) and negative affectivity (NA) were measured using the Positive and Negative 
Affectivity Schedule (PANAS:Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  The schedule consists 
of 10 positive and 10 negative adjectives that respondents rate on a 5-point Likert scale, 
in terms of how they have felt over the last six weeks. High scores on each scale denote 
higher levels of affectivity. Watson et al. (1988) reported internal consistency reliabilities 
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for PA and NA of .87 and .88 respectively.  Eight week test-retest reliabilities were .68 
for PA and .71 for NA.  
 
Procedure 
The survey was sponsored by Army Aviation Headquarters and survey forms were 
included in the pay envelopes of all maintenance personnel along with a covering letter 
explaining the purposes of the survey. To ensure anonymity, self-addressed envelopes were 
included so that the forms could be returned directly to the investigator. At the completion of the 
study, feedback sessions on the main findings of the study were conducted by the investigator 
and a research assistant. 
 
Results  
 
After initial data screening with SPSS (version 11.0.1) to check for accuracy of data 
entry, the first stage of the analysis involved the reduction of the 112 items comprising MES to a 
manageable set of underlying factors. The maximum likelihood method of exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) with oblique rotation was used for this purpose.  Thirty-two of the 112 items 
came from well-validated scales (e.g., PANAS and GHQ) and a further 12 items were concerned 
with demographic data, so these were not subjected to factor analysis. The remaining 68 items 
were developed or adapted for the purposes of the present study and formed too large a block to 
factor analyze simultaneously. Accordingly, a strategy was adopted wherein groups of items that 
were intended to measure a particular construct (Climate, Morale, or Health) were factor 
analyzed separately. Where there was evidence of unidimensionality and where reliability 
analysis suggested that a scale formed from the items had good internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha), the construct was retained for further analysis.  
 
As a result of these analyses, six items and the Responsibility scale (5 items) were 
discarded. All remaining scales, except for the error scale, had satisfactory reliability estimates 
with alpha estimates above .70. The low reliability of the error scale (.60) was of concern but 
was still adequate for research purposes (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Means, standard 
deviations, and reliability estimates for the scales are shown in Table 1 to provide background 
information about sample characteristics.  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for MES Scales (N = 240) 
Scale Number of Items Mean SD Alpha 
Recognition 5 2.60  .73 .81 
Safety Focus 3 3.81  .63 .76 
Supervision 6 3.46  .61 .84 
Feedback 7 2.99  .48 .72 
Training 4 3.49  .63 .76 
Satisfaction 7 3.38  .59 .86 
Orgcommit 7 3.08  .70 .86 
Stress 10 3.08  .49 .77 
GHQ 12 1.88  .45 .89 
Fatigue 4 2.56  .73 .79 
PA 10  3.03  .79 .91 
NA 10 1.61  .57 .84 
Turnover 1 1.53 .75  
Errors 3 3.33  .61 .60 
Note. Reliability could not be estimated for the Turnover scale 
 
The third column in Table 1 shows the average rating of all respondents on a scale 
ranging from 1 to 5 (except for the GHQ, where scores ranges from 0 to 4). Scores for many 
scales were reflected so that - with the exception of Stress, Fatigue, GHQ, Turnover, NA, and 
Errors - a high score is desirable.  We can see from these statistics that this sample could be 
described as having a high concern for safety; as being well-supported, well-trained, and well-
supervised; as being satisfied with their jobs but desirous of more recognition; as having 
moderate levels of fatigue, low levels of negative affectivity, and as being prepared to admit to 
making job-related errors. These statistics are in keeping with a military maintenance 
organization most of whose members were at the time of the survey engaged in normal work 
schedules in peace-time conditions. Another feature of these data is that the standard deviations 
indicate a reasonable spread of scores on all variables, suggesting that there were individuals in 
the data set who could not be characterized by the above description. This variation in response 
patterns forms the basis for the analysis of relations among all variables, leading ultimately to the 
test of a structural model that links the variables in a causal network. The correlations will be 
examined first; they are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Correlations Among Variables (N = 240) 
Scales 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
  1. Recognition 1.00             
  2. Safety Focus .31             
  3. Supervision .27 .30            
  4. Feedback .44 .28 .39           
  5. Training .42 .37 .38 .43          
  6. Satisfaction .36 .23 .21 .18 .44         
  7. Orgcommit .45 .34 .38 .30 .42 .48        
  8. Stress -.33 -.17 -.15 -.23 -.29 -.20 -.18       
  9. GHQ -.35 -.21 -.18 -.38 -.41 -.35 -.27 .44      
10. Fatigue -.14 -.04 -.07 -.14 -.17 -.11 -.09 .14 .20     
11. PA .36 .23 .26 .34 .42 .51 .48 -.27 -.51 -.19    
12. NA -.22 -.10 -.23 -.22 -.20 -.17 -.14 .42 .70 .15 -.23   
13. Turnover  -.24 -.07 .00 -.09 -.14 -.30 -.33 .13 .20 .07 -.22 .15  
14. Errors -.16 -.12 -.09 -.13 -.19 -.07 -.10 .48 .31 -.05 -.15 .25 .04 
 
Note. Correlations above .15 are significant at .01 level 
The main dependent variable, Errors, is shown on the bottom line. It can be seen that five 
of the independent variables were significantly correlated (p < .01) with Errors. The highest 
correlation was with Stress, which on its own accounted for 23% of the variance in self-reported 
errors. Other variables with significant (p < .01) associations included GHQ (r = .31), NA (r = 
.25), Training (r = -.19), and Recognition (r = -.16).  
 
Modelling the Interactions Among Organizational and Individual Variables and Errors 
The main aim of the present study was to build a model that captures the major sources of 
variance in maintenance errors. Before attempting this step, however, it was first necessary to 
deal with the potential criticism that observed relations among the climate measures in Table 2 
could simply be reflecting biases that are inherent in self-report measures (Danna & Griffin, 
1999; James & James, 1989). There are many ways to deal with method variance, none of them 
completely effective. NA and PA are often used as direct measures of a tendency to respond in a 
positive or a negative way to self-report items. The influence of these variables can then be 
removed statistically, leaving the partial correlations relatively free of method variance. This 
technique has its drawbacks (see Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003 for a review), 
the main criticism relating to the fact that NA and PA capture more than method variance and 
that partialling out their influence may lead to serious underestimations of the strength of 
relations among variables. However, objections about method variance can be overcome if it can 
be shown that substantial variance still remains after NA and PA have been controlled using 
hierarchical regression analyses. That was the case in the present study: NA and PA accounted 
for a significant 6% of the variance in errors when they were entered as the first step in a 
hierarchical regression analysis. However, as will soon be demonstrated, this represented a small 
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part of the overall variance captured by the structural model. Furthermore, when all variables 
were entered in the regression equation, the contribution of PA and NA was not significant, 
suggesting that method variance was not a problem. 
 
Structural equation modelling (SEM), using Version 4.0 of Arbuckle's (1999) AMOS 
program, was then employed to test the hypothesized model of the relations among the MES 
variables. Because of the unfavourable ratio of free parameters to cases, a partially aggregated 
model (Gribbons & Hocevar, 1998) was used wherein subscales based on the EFA represented 
the various first-order constructs in the conceptual model. The choice of fit indices in SEM is 
often a controversial matter. In this study, three indices of model fit were used. The first index 
was the ratio of χ2 to degrees of freedom where Kline (1998) proposed that a ratio of less than 
three is acceptable.  One incremental fit index was used; the comparative fit index (CFI: Bentler, 
1990) which is considered to be reasonably robust against violations of assumptions and where a 
value above .90 was considered to indicate satisfactory fit. The third index used was the root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA: Steiger, 1990), which indicates the mean 
discrepancy between the observed covariances and those implied by the model per degree of 
freedom, and therefore has the advantage of being sensitive to model complexity. A value of .05 
or lower indicates a good fit and values up to .08 indicate an acceptable fit (Kline, 1998). 
 
A test of the full structural model shown in Figure 1 (with Responsibility removed) 
yielded acceptable fit indices (CMIN/DF = 1.85; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .06). The model predicted 
47% of the variance in (psychological) Health, 65% of the variance in Morale, 27% of the 
variance in Turnover, and 39% of the variance in Errors. However, none of the direct paths from 
Climate, Turnover, and Morale to Errors were significant. Following a strategy of deleting each 
of these pathways in turn and using the Chi Square difference test to note the effect on fit 
indices, it was found that the only the last of these three pathways (Morale to Errors) was needed 
to maintain good fit.   
 
Given the exploratory nature of this research, modification indices were inspected to 
check the possibility that other theoretically justifiable changes may improve the model. The 
only noteworthy suggestion involved the fitting of a pathway from Fatigue to Errors. In other 
words, Fatigue shared variance with Errors that was not captured by the latent trait, Health. 
Further investigation of this part of the measurement model showed that although Fatigue loaded 
on Health, the loading was not strong and there was justification for redefining it as a stand-alone 
variable. This change had a flow-on effect and several other pathways in this part of the model 
were revised. The final model, with parameter estimates, is shown in Figure 2. This model fitted 
the data (CMIN/DF = 1.68; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .05) and all pathways were significant. 
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Figure 2 Final model depicting interactions among Climate, Morale, Strain, Fatigue, Turnover, and Errors 
 
For readers not familiar with SEM diagrams, the model can be interpreted as follows. 
Climate is a latent variable, measured by five different scales. The arrows (pathways) branching 
from Climate to Health, Fatigue, Turnover, and Morale indicate that Climate is hypothesized as 
influencing these other four variables. The figures on each of the pathways are standardized path 
coefficients, which can vary between plus and minus one. A high positive value for a path 
coefficient indicates that increases in the variable at the start of the path are associated with 
increases in the variable at the end. A high negative coefficient indicates that increases in the 
first variable are associated with decreases in the second. A coefficient close to zero indicates 
that the two variables are not related and that there is no justification for having a pathway 
linking them.  
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To illustrate further, Health is measured by two variables, Stress and GHQ. The pathway 
from Climate to Health has a coefficient of -.67, indicating that better psychological climate 
leads to better psychological health (because of the way in which the markers were scored, a low 
score on Health was desirable). Climate has another pathway leading to Fatigue. The negative 
coefficient (-.21) indicates that as Climate improves, Fatigue decreases. A third pathway from 
Climate leads to Turnover. In this case, the positive coefficient (.45) does not make sense from a 
theoretical viewpoint because there is no reason why a more favorable climate would lead to 
higher job turnover. A check of the correlations between the individual climate measures and 
Turnover (Table 2) shows that the true relationship is negative; indicating higher job turnover 
when the climate is poor. Reversals of sign in path coefficients can occur when predictors of a 
dependent variable are themselves correlated. In the present case, both Morale and Climate are 
used to predict Turnover and these two predictors are highly correlated. Delete the pathway from 
Morale to Turnover and the coefficient for the pathway linking Climate and Turnover switches to 
a negative sign, as one would expect on a theoretical basis. The final pathway from Climate is 
that leading to Morale and it can be seen that there is a strong positive association between these 
variables (β = .82). Morale, in turn, has a strong negative relationship (β = -.82) with Turnover. 
In other words, the better the morale, the less likelihood there is that workers will think about 
leaving the organization.  
 
There are three pathways leading to Errors. The first of these is from Morale (β = .28). 
Again, the direction of the relationship is not in the expected direction because of the presence of 
correlations among the predictor set. Deleting the pathway from Strain to Errors results in the 
pathway from Morale to Errors switching to its true negative sign, indicating that high morale is 
indeed associated with lower error rates, as one would expect on an a priori basis. The major 
predictor of Errors in this model is Health which, when tested on its own in a reduced model (not 
shown here), captured 30% of the variance. 
 
The main features of the model are the impressive R2 values for all dependent variables. 
Safety Climate accounted for 44% of the variance in Health, 67% of the variance in Morale, and 
a small 4% of the variance in Fatigue. Together with Morale, it also accounted for 27% of the 
variance in job turnover intentions. Together, these variables accounted for 45% of the variance 
in self-reported errors. The demonstration that safety climate measures can be modeled using the 
hierarchical arrangement shown in Figure 1 supports other researchers who have argued for a 
hierarchical model of climate (e.g., James & James, 1989; Parker et al., 2003). 
 
Discussion 
 
The Maintenance Environment Survey (MES) provided two sorts of data: descriptive 
data and data pertaining to relations among variables thought to be important in maintenance. 
Both types of data have proved valuable in this quest to uncover precursors to maintenance 
errors. The descriptive data, collected from 240 respondents, paints a picture of overall 
satisfaction with many aspects of the workplace. There was strong support for the level of 
training and the quality of supervision, two areas that were often criticised during the interviews. 
Thus, the survey proved a useful counterbalance to some impressions acquired through the 
interviews. 
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At the survey level, MES captured some of the major factors relating to work 
performance. The model shown in Figure 2 helps to explain seemingly conflicting findings 
emerging from the analysis of the incident database and the interview data.  As mentioned 
before, the incident reports tended to put the spotlight on human error as the cause of incidents.  
This is not a surprising outcome; Shappell and Wiegmann (1997) noted that such reporting 
systems generally focus on identifying "human failures without regard for why the failures 
occurred" (p.270).  Figure 2 shows that the causal path is as follows: organizational factors 
influence individuals, who in turn make the errors. The SEM approach has helped to demonstrate 
the nature of this link. These findings support the claims of other researchers who point to the 
influence that social and organizational factors have on human error (e.g., Patankar, 2002; 
Reason, 1990; Sutcliffe & Rugg, 1998). The present study extends these findings by 
demonstrating that these linkages are primarily indirect, mediated by individual differences in 
psychological health and morale.  
 
Implications for Maintenance Work 
Reason (1997) likened the practice of surveying the safety climate of organizations as 
akin to assessing their safety health. This is a very apt description because it is precisely what is 
implied by the model presented in this paper. Workers’ perceptions of such things as 
management’s commitment to safety, appropriateness of training, availability of resources, and 
possibly many other variables not measured here, do have links with safety outcomes. Whether 
the perceptions are justified is irrelevant because the effect of the perceptions is felt on morale 
and psychological health whether there is justification for the perceptions or not. The model also 
shows that if morale is affected, workers think about leaving the organization, hardly a desirable 
outcome given the time and money already invested in that worker and the time and money that 
will be expended in recruitment and further training. The demonstration of indirect links between 
climate and errors (via psychological health and morale) suggests that the mere presence of 
unfavourable perceptions of organizational factors is not sufficient in itself to lead to errors. 
Unfavourable organizational conditions place pressure on the individual and when the individual 
begins to succumb to these pressures, errors begin to occur.  
  
The implications are that we should measure both psychological climate and individual health 
and morale variables on a regular basis to ensure that there are no problems of this kind 
developing. Similar suggestions have already been made in relation to the value of attitudinal 
surveys in the maintenance environment. Baranzini and colleagues described a new training, 
evaluation, and research tool called The Aircraft Maintenance Attitude Survey (AMAS). The 
AMAS can be used to improve training effectiveness by focusing on safety relevant 
characteristics of teams and can also help safety goals by monitoring awareness of human factors 
variables that are related to safety (Baranzini, Bacchi, & Cacciabue, 2001). The UK Civil 
Aviation Authority is promoting a similar approach through its Safety Health of Maintenance 
Engineers (SHoMeO tool; CAA, 2003). A different questionnaire has been used in the present 
study but the findings provide a strong empirical basis for the use of such surveys.  Cox and 
Cheyne (2000) encouraged the reporting of data gained from such surveys as radar plots. 
Graphic devices such as star plots can help to monitor the safety climate of the organization and 
the psychological health of the individuals. They will be especially useful if benchmark 
comparisons within and across organizations become possible (Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2001).  
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Limitations of Study 
In closing, it is important to recognize the methodological shortcomings of the approach 
followed in this study. The most evident weakness is the use of a cross-sectional methodology, 
the weaknesses of which in determining causality are well-documented. The use of self-report 
measures for all variables is also problematic. James and James (1989) raised the possibility that 
predispositions in affect influence both the general climate factor and the first-order climate 
factors. In other words, affect could be responsible for the commonality observed among climate 
measures and also responsible for the correlations between climate and performance. One of the 
strengths of the present study is that it used PA and NA to capture this type of method variance 
and, in so doing, demonstrated that substantial correlations exist among all variables even when 
PA and NA are partialled out.  
 
Another criticism of self-report measures is that they may not correlate with objective 
measures of performance. In the present context this criticism would translate into the claim that 
self-reported errors may not correspond with actual errors in the workplace. This criticism can 
best be addressed by pointing to various studies that have demonstrated a correlation between 
safety climate measures and objective indicators of safety performance (Donald & Canter, 1994; 
Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 1980, 2000). Theoretical accounts of the links between 
attitudes, intentions, and behavior, such as that provided by the Theory of Planned Behavior 
(Ajzen, 1991), also strongly support the use of self-report measures in safety research (e.g., 
Fogarty & Shaw, 2003). 
 
A further limitation is that the model tested in the current research program has been 
fitted to data collected in a military environment. Maintenance engineers working in this setting 
face some challenges (e.g., demands of military duties) that are not faced by those working in 
commercial settings. The converse also holds true. The model therefore needs to be tested in 
different organizational settings. Furthermore, as Fahlbruch and Wilpert (1999) pointed out, with 
the growing trend towards outsourcing of safety units, it may become necessary to extend the 
safety climate section of the model to include inter-organizational factors. There is no doubt that 
these factors are becoming important considerations in the aviation industry where key tasks like 
maintenance are now routinely conducted by third parties. This is true of military as well as 
civilian aviation organizations.  
 
To conclude, whilst the FAA understands the implications of the tension that exists 
between increasing demands for air travel and the economic and logistical forces that put 
pressure on vital functions such as aviation maintenance, increasing the efficiency of 
maintenance work is just one approach to the problem. Attempts to increase the efficiency of 
maintenance work need to consider the dynamics of the work environment as they are perceived 
and experienced by the maintainers themselves. The model reported in this study represents a 
mathematical approach to capturing and quantifying these dynamics. The model may lack the 
compelling concreteness of Reason’s (1990) famous Swiss cheese model, but it has the potential 
to be just as effective in guiding practical interventions designed to improve safety. The model 
contains branches to other organizational outcomes, such as morale and turnover intentions, 
which undoubtedly affect the overall efficiency of the organization. Methodologies of the kind 
outlined in this study can provide an empirical basis for directing and evaluating interventions 
aimed at improving aviation safety. 
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